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JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over
this appeal pursuant to Article VIII, §5 of the Utah Constitution, Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(a) and (j) (1953 as amended), and Rule 3(a), Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from an Order entered by the
Honorable George E. Ballif, Fourth Judicial District Court
of Utah County, State of Utah, on April 6, 1988, granting
Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment and denying Plaint i f f s Motion for Summary Judgment.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
1.

Does the question of whether Zions had com-

pleted the reissuance of the $10,000 certificate of deposit
payable to "Garth Youd" before the time Zions acted to
replace the same $10,000 certificate of deposit with a
certificate of deposit payable to "Wilford Youd, Leona
Warner and LaRaine Mackley" pursuant to Wilford Youd's
instructions, constitute a genuine issue of material fact
raised by Defendants1 Motion fo*- Summary Judgment so as to
render the trial court's grant of summary judgment erroneous?

2.

Because of his possession and due presentment

of the $10,000 certificate of deposit, was Plaintiff entitled as a matter of law to payment of the $10,000 certificate pursuant to §70A-3-116 and the terms stated on the
face of the certificate?
3.

Did W. Youd's "request" to prevent payment to

Plaintiff fail to comply with §75-6-101 such that

court's

grant of summary judgment was erroneous as a matter of law?
4.

Did a bailment of the $10,000 and $15,000

certificates of deposit exist such that Zions1 issuance of
new $10,000 and $15,000 certificate in the names of W. Youd
and his daughters constitutes conversion?
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
1.

Nature of the Case
Plaintiff, Garth Youd, brings this action to

recover for Defendants' negligent prosecution of an action
on behalf of Plaintiff against Zions First National Bank
("Zions"). The action against Zions was based on Zions1
improper payment of two certificates of deposit to Plaintiff's father, Wilford Youd (hereafter "W. Youd"), and his
daughters.
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2.

Course of Proceedings
On or about February 26, 1987, Plaintiff filed a

Complaint against Defendants alleging that Defendants had
negligently represented Plaintiff in an action against Zions
and that as a result, Plaintiff was prevented from pursuing
his claim against Zions.

Pursuant to a Stipulation and

Order dated September 9, 1987, Plaintiff and Defendants
stipulated that Defendant, Johnson, was negligent in failing
to appear at the pre-trial conference and in failing to file
an appellate brief.

An Order entered by the Fourth Judi-

cial District Court limited the issues in the case to
causation and damages.
On or about January 27, 1988, Defendants filed a
Motion for Summary Judgment and on or about February 11,
1988, Plaintiff filed a cross Motion for Summary Judgment.
The Fourth Judicial District

Court heard arguments of

counsel on their respective Motions for Summary Judgment at
the pre-trial conference on February 26, 1988.

On March 21,

1988, the Honorable George E. Ballif issued a Ruling denying
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and granting Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment.
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Addendum No. 1.

An

Order reflecting the Judge's Ruling was entered on April 6,
1988.

Addendum No. 2.

Plaintiff filed a Notice of Appeal

with the Utah Supreme Court on April 20, 1988.

On July 7,

1988, the Utah Supreme Court poured this case over to the
Utah Court of Appeals.
3.

Statement of Facts
a.

Facts Surrounding Defendants1 Negligent Prosecution of the Zions Action

In early 1983, Plaintiff employed Defendant, Johnson, who at the time was an attorney practicing with Defendant law firm, Howard, Lewis and Peterson, to prosecute a
civil action against Zions (the wZions Action").

(Record on

Appea1, Garth Youd v. Richard B. Johnson and Howard, Lewis &
Peterson, civil no. CV87-457 (hereafter " R . " ) , p. 1, 1T4 and
p. 12, 1F1.) Defendants filed a Complaint against Zions on
behalf of Plaintiff in the United States District Court in
and for the District of Utah, Central Division, on or about
November 15, 1983, Garth Youd v. Zions First National Bank,
civil no. C83-1368W.

(R. 94-103.)

Thereafter, Defendants

negligently failed to appear at a pre-trial conference in
the Zions Action.

(R. 24.)

As a result of Defendants'

failure to appear, the United States District Court in and
for the District of Utah, Central Division, entered an Order
of Dismissal, dismissing the Complaint in the Zions Action
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with prejudice.

(R. 108-109.)

Defendants filed a Motion to

Set Aside Order of Dismissal which was denied by the Honorable David K. Winder on December 20, 1985.

(R. 2, 12-13.)

On January 17, 1986, Defendants filed a Notice of
Appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit, appealing Judge Winderfs Order, Garth Youd v. Zions
First National Bank, case no. 86-1143.

Thereafter, De-

fendants negligently failed to file an appellant's brief in
the appeal of the Zions Action.

(R. 24.)

As a consequence,

the Clerk of the Court of Appeals ordered that the appeal be
dismissed for lack of prosecution.

(R. 111.)

On or about February 26, 1987, Plaintiff filed this
action against Defendants alleging their negligent representation of Plaintiff in the Zions Action and that, as a
result of their negligence, Plaintiff was prevented from
pursuing his claim against Zions.

(R. 1-3.)

Plaintiff and

Defendants entered into a Stipulation dated September 9,
1987, that Defendants were negligent in failing to appear at
a pre-trial conference and for failing to file and appellate
brief in the Zions Action appeal.

(R. 24-25.)

The Fourth

Judicial District Court entered an Order limiting the issues
in the case to causation and damages.

- 5-

(R. 26.)

b.

Facts of the Zions Action

The Complaint in the Zions Action alleges that
Zions was liable to Plaintiff for wrongfully paying two
certificates of deposit to W. Youd.

(R. 94-103.)

The two

time certificates of deposit in the Zions Action were issued
by Zions and are identified as follows:
1.

A six-month time certificate of deposit

dated March 6, 1980, in the sum of $10,000, number
31-600964-6, payable to "Wilford Youd or Garth
Youd;" and
2.

A six-month time certificate of deposit

dated October 27, 1980, in the sum of $15,000,
number 31-616341-9, payable to "Wilford Youd or
Garth Youd."
(R. 115-118.)

Addendum Nos. 3 and 4.

Both certificates

state on their face that
THIS CERTIFIES THAT there has
been deposited in this Bank the
amount of . . . payable to Wilford
Youd or Garth Youd . . . interest
at a rate of . . • per annum,
commencing from . . . and payable
to depositor, or if more than one,
to either of any said depositors .
. . in current funds upon presentation anc surrender of this certificate properly endorsed.
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The certificates were kept in a safety deposit box
at Zions which could be accessed by Plaintiff or his sisters, Leona Warner or LaRaine Mackley.

(Deposition of Garth

Youd, November 7, 1984 (hereafter "G. Youd Depo."), p. 53,
55.)

On February 26, 1982, Plaintiff accessed the above-

described safety deposit box and took into his possession
both certificates of deposit,

^d. at 69-70.

On or about

September 7, 1982, Plaintiff took the certificates of
deposit to the Spanish Fork Branch of Zions.

The $10,000

certificate of deposit had matured a day earlier, on September 6, 1982.

(R. 177.)

The $15,000 certificate of deposit

was unmatured and would not mature until October 27, 1982.
(R. 177.)
Plaintiff instructed Zions1 personnel to recover
the interest on the $10,000 certificate of deposit which had
been paid paid to Plaintiff's sister, Leona Warner, and to
pay that sum to Plaintiff.

G. Youd Depo. at 71-72.

Plain-

tiff further gave Zions specific instructions renew the
$10,000 certificate of deposit in his name alone and to
place the $15,000 certificate of deposit which had not yet
matured and the reissued $10,000 certificate of deposit in
Plaintiff's personal safety deposit box.
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Ld. at 75.

After

Plaintiff endorsed the $10,000 certificate of deposit, he
presented it to Zions and Zions took possession of it and
the $15,000 certificate of deposit.

16.

at 74.

In his Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion for Summary Judgment, Plaintiff asserted that Zions
completed issuing the $10,000 certificate of deposit in
Plaintiff's name alone.

(R. 87.)

In support of its as-

sertion, Plaintiff cited depositional testimony of Donna
Jensen, who was at the time of the subject events a commercial loan secretary with Zions.

(R. 87, 136-140.) In her

deposition, Ms. Jensen testified that she remembers having
dealt with Plaintiff regarding two certificates of deposit
on two occasions.

(Deposition of Donna Jensen, May 16,

1984, (hereafter "Jensen Depo.") p. 14-16, 21; Addendum No.
5.)

Her testimony indicates that on both occasions,

Plaintiff presented a certificate of deposit payable to
"Wilford Youd or Garth Youd" and requested that they be
renewed in Plaintiff1 s name only.

Id^. at 14.

Ms. Jensen

testified that on both occasions she completed Plaintiff's
instructions and filled out a certificate of deposit for the
same amount in Plaintiff's name alone.
30.1
1

JE_d. at 14-16, 21,

Neither Richard Roach nor Irene Brunson, the two
The disposition and location of the $10,000 certificate
- 8-

other Zions1 employees who were involved in the transaction,
disputed Ms. Jensen's testimony that the certificate has
been reissued.

Deposition of Richard Roach, May 16, 1984,

("Roach Depo."), p. 30-45; Deposition of Irene Brunson, May
16, 1984, ("Brunson Depo."), p. 17-18.
After Plaintiff presented the $10,000 and $15,000
certificates of deposit to Zions, Richard Roach, the branch
manager of the Spanish Fork Branch of Zions, became aware of
Plaintiff's request regarding the certificates.
at 36; Jensen Depo. at 22-26.

Roach Depo.

Though the exact time in not

certain, Mr. Roach met with Leona Warner, W. Youd's daughter, who informed Mr. Roach that the "family" was concerned
about the expenses which W. Youd would incur later in his
life.

Roach Depo. at 38-41.

Mr. Roach then requested that

Ms. Warner have W. Youd contact him.

Roach Depo. at 39.

Apparently responding to Mr. Roach's request,
Wilford Youd called Mr. Roach at the bank.
42.

Roach Depo. at

Mr. Roach informed W. Youd that Plaintiff had made a

request to remove W. Youd's name from of the $10,000 and
$.15,000 certificates of deposit, and to put the certificates
in Plaintiff's name alone.

Mr. Roach, however, d^'d not know

of deposit issued in Plaintiff's name alone is unknown.
Roach Depo. at 32-24.
- 9-

whether the process of reissuing the $10,000 certificate t
Plaintiff
42-43.

had been completed.

Roach Depo. at 36, 37,

W. Youd instructed Mr. Roach to take Plaintiff1s

name off both certificates of deposit and to place the
certificates in the names of W. Youd's and his two daughters, Leona Warner and LaRaine Mackley, and to not pay the
$10,000 certificate of deposit to Plaintiff under any
circumstances.

Roach Depo. at 44. Mr. Roach agreed to car

out W.Youd f s request.

Id.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
ARGUMENT I, Points 1 and 2
Summary judgment is proper only where there is no
genuine issue of material fact and where the moving party
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

In considering a

Motion for Summary Judgment, a court should view the evidence in a light most favorable to the party opposing the
motion.
In this case, there is clearly a genuine issue of
material fact.

The deposition of a Zions1 employee in-

dicates that Zions immediately carried out Plaintiff's
instructions to reissue the $10,000 certificate of deposit
as a single party account in the name of Plaintiff alone,
immediately after receiving the instructions.
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This testi-

mony conflicts with Defendants1 assertion that the $10,000
certificate remained a multiple-party account, payable to
"Wilford Youd or Garth Youd."
The resulting question of fact is material for the
reasons that if the $10,000 certificate of deposit had been
renewed in Plaintiff's name alone, §75-6-112 does not apply
to protect Zions from liability, and Zions may be rendered
liable to Plaintiff for conversion of the certificate of
deposit.

Accordingly, this case should be remanded to the

trial court for trial on the issue of whether the $10,000
certificate of deposit had been renewed in Plaintiff's name
alone as a single-party account.
ARGUMENT II, Point 1
If the court accepts the trial court's finding that
there was no genuine issue of material fact and that Zions
had not reissued the $10,000 certificate in Plaintiff's name
alone, §§75-6-108 and 75-6-112, still do not apply to
protect Zions from liability for three reasons.

First,

Plaintiff was entitled to immediate payment of the $10,000
certificate of deposit, in the form of a reissued certificate, pursuant to §70A-3-116 of the Uniform Commercial
Code.

That section establishes that an alternate payee on

an instrument who has possession of the instrument is

- 11 -

entitled to payment of the instrument.

Plaintiff was

entitled to immediate payment for the additional reason that
he complied with the payment requirements clearly stated on
the face of the certificate.
Because Zions refused to accept Plaintiff's due
presentment, Plaintiff acquired an immediate right of
recourse under §70A-5-307, as well as a cause of action for
breach of contract.

Section 75-6-112 has absolutely no

application to the question of whether a financial institution must pay a duly presented and matured certificate of
deposit.

That section applies to protect the financial

institutions from liability only after payment has been made
on a duly presented multiple-party instrument.
ARGUMENT 11/ Point 2
The second reason why Plaintiff is entitled to
recover against Zions as a matter of law is that, W. Youd
failed to make a "proper request" as required by §§75-6-108
and 75-6-101.

Sections 75-6-108 and 75-6-101 require that

in order for a financial institution to be relieved of liability for payment of a multiple-party account, it must
have received a "proper request" for payment.

"Proper

request" is defined as a request which complies with the
conditions of the account, which in this case are 1) pre-

- 12 -

sentment, 2) endorsement, and 3) surrender of the certificate.

W. Youd did not present the certificate, endorse

the certificate or surrender the certificate, but merely
made an oral request over the telephone to change the payee
on the certificate of deposit.

Because W. Youd failed to

make a proper request, Zions should not have complied with
his instructions and should have paid the certificates of
deposit pursuant to Plaintiff's instructions. Accordingly,
Zions should not have prevailed as a matter of law.
ARGUMENT II, Point 3
Finally, Zions is subject to liability for Zions1
conversion and negligent handling of the $10,000 and $15,000
certificates of deposit.

Plaintiff's entrusting of the

certificates of deposit to Zions gave rise to a baileebailor relationship which obligated Zions to exercise due
care in complying with Plaintiff's instructions.

In com-

plete disregard of Plaintiff's instructions to renew the
$10,000 certificate and place both certificates of deposit
in Plaintiff's safety deposit box, Zions acted to extinguish
Plaintiff's ownership interest in both certificates and
replace the certificates with certificates in the names of
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W. Youd and his daughters.

For this additional reason, the

trial court's grant of summary judgment was erroneous as a
matter of law.
ARGUMENT I
BECAUSE A GENUINE ISSUE OF MATERIAL FACT EXISTED/ THE TRIAL COURT
ERRED IN GRANTING DEFENDANTS1
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states

summary judgment shall be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if
any, show that there is no genuine
issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled
to a judgment as a matter of law.
(Emphasis added.)

The summary judgment procedure is in-

tended to avoid the time and expense of litigation where the
facts are undisputed and there is no issue of law. Rich v.
McGovern, 551 P.2d 1266, 1267-1268 (Utah 1976); Western
Pacific Transport Co. v. Beehive State Agricultural Co-Op.,
497 P.2d 854, 855 (Utah 1979).

However, summary judgment is

a drastic remedy and should be granted with extreme care.
Housley v. Annaconda Co., 527 P.2d 390, 393 (Utah 1967).
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In determining whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists, the trial court must evaluate the pleadings,
affidavits and depositions on file in the case in a light
most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.
Frisbey v. K & K Construction Co., 676 P.2d 387, 389 (Utah
1984).

If there is any doubt or uncertainty whether a

question of fact exists, the doubt must be resolved in favor
of the party opposing the motion.

_I_d.

If a court grants

summary judgment where there is a doubt as to whether a
question of fact exists, the opposing party is unjustly
denied the opportunity to conduct discovery and present
additional evidence to resolve the question. Furthermore,
unjustified granting of summary judgment fails the goal of
avoiding unnecessary litigation and instead results in even
greater expenditures. Western Pacific Transport Co., 597
P.2d at 855.
In ruling on Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, the trial court concluded that no genuine issue of
material fact existed between the parties.

(R. 195.)

However, the court contradicted its conclusion on page three
of the ruling by acknowledging that Plaintiff did dispute
one of Defendants1 factual assertions.

- 15 -

(R. 196.)

Defendants1 arguments, as outlined in their Memorandum Supporting Defendants1 Motion for Summary Judgment,
are

premised on the fact Zions had not reissued the $10,000

certificate of deposit

in Plaintiff's name alone at the

time W. Youd requested that the certificate be put in his
and his daughters1 names. 2

(R. 43-47, 179-183).

Contro-

verting Defendants1 representation of the facts, Plaintiff
asserted in his Motion in Opposition to Summary Judgment
that the reissuance of the $10,0000 certificate of deposit
had been completed before W. Youd instructed Zions to not
make payment to Plaintiff.

(R. 87.) In support of this

assertion^ Plaintiff cited depositional testimony of the
Zions employee most involved in the transaction indicating
that the $10,000 certificate of deposit was reissued in the
name of Plaintiff alone before W. Youd contacted the bank.
(R. 87.)
Defendants even entitled one of their arguments, "The
Certificates of Deposit Were 'Joint Accounts' Under Utah
Law," clearly implying that the certificates of deposit
were never reissued as a single party account. (R. 43.)
Additionally, Defendants' statement of fact in its
Memorandum in Support of Summary Judgment assumes that
the $10,000 certificate of deposit was not reissued in
Plaintiff's name alone, prior to W. Youd's instructions
to do otherwise. (R. 39-40.) Finally, Defendants
argued in their Memorandum Opposing Plaintiff's Motion
for Summary Judgment that Zions followed W. Youd's
instructions and, impliedly, not those of Plaintiff.
(R. 179.)
- 16 -

Donna Jensen, in her deposition of May 16, 1984,
testified that one of her normal duties as commercial loan
secretary with Zions was the issuance and reissuance of
certificates of deposit.

Jensen Depo. at 6.

She further

testified that she dealt with Plaintiff on two occasions
regarding certificates of deposit payable to "Wilford Youd
or Garth Youd."

j^d. at 20. On each occasion, Plaintiff

presented Ms. Jensen with a certificate of deposit payable
to "Wilford Youd or Garth Youd" and instructed her to
reissue it in Plaintiff's name alone.

Jjd. at 12.

The following testimony of Donna Jensen indicates
that she complied with Plaintiff's instructions and completed the physical process of reissuing a new certificate
of deposit in Plaintiff1s name alone:
QUESTION: And his [Garth Youd's]
simple instruction to you was
simply to do what with the time
certificate?
JENSEN: He wanted to renew it and
just have it put in his name.
QUESTION:
JENSEN:

What did you say?
I did it.

QUESTION: And did you take a time
certificate he had furnished you
and fill out another time certificate that would be in the same

- 17 -

amount with interest in his name
only?
JENSEN:
Jensen Depo. at 14.

Yes.
Plaintiff cited this testimony, to-

gether with testimony on page 21 of Ms. Jensen's deposition, in his Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment.
(R. 87.)

Additional testimony by Ms. Jensen, not cited by

Plaintiff, further supports the fact that the certificate of
deposit had been reissued.

Jensen Depo. at 30.

The trial court apparently disregarded this evidence clearly supporting Plaintiff's view of the facts,
despite Defendants' failure to cite any
supporting their position.

evidence whatsoever

Richard Roach, the Branch

Manager of the Spanish Fork Branch of Zions, testified that
he simply did not know whether Ms. Jensen had completed
reissuing the $10,000 certificate in Plaintiff's name alone.
Roach Depo. at 36, 37.

Additionally, Irene Brunson, the

other Zions employee involved in the transaction, testified
that she had no recollection of Plaintiff's instructions to
renew the $10,000 certificate of deposit and to place both
certificates in Plaintiff's safety deposit box.
Depo. at 10-14, 16-18.
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Brunson

The only evidence which might be argued to support
Defendants' position that the certificate of deposit was not
reissued is the physical absence of the reissued certificate.

According to the testimony of Plaintiff, both

certificates were left with the bank in order that they be
placed in his safety deposit box.

G. Youd Depo. at 77-78.

However, the bank has been unable to locate the reissued
certificate of deposit or a copy of the reissued certificate
of deposit. Roach Depo. at 34.

If the certificate exists,

it must be assumed that the bank misplaced it or destroyed
it upon W. Youd's instructions to reissue the certificate
without Plaintiff's name.

In any event, this evidence (or

rather absence of evidence) was not raised by Defendants.
When the testimony of Donna Jensen is viewed in a
light most favorable to Plaintiff, it is apparent that a
factual dispute existed involving the reissuance of the
$10,000 certificate of deposit.
fact,

In view of this question of

the trial court erred in granting Defendants' Motion

for Summary Judgment.

The materiality of the disputed fact

is outlined below in Points 1 and 2.

It should be noted

that this factual issue involves only the $10,000 certificate of deposit and not the $15,000 certificate, which had
not yet matured.
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POINT 1;

Whether the reissuance of the
$10/000 certificate of deposit had
been completed is a material fact
for the reason that/ if completed/
§§75-6-108 and 75-6-112 do""n"5T
protect the bank from liability.
The question of whether the transaction had been

completed before W. Youd contacted Zions is very clearly a
material issue of fact.

It is material for the reason that

a finding by the court that the $10,000 certificate of
deposit was reissued would preclude Zions from the protection afforded by §§75-6-108 and 75-6-112, Utah Code Ann.
(1953 as amended).
Utah Code Annotated §75-6-108 states in relevant
part that n[a]ny multiple party account may be paid/ on
request/ to any one or more of the parties."
added.)

(Emphasis

Section 75-6-112 "discharges a financial insti-

tution from all claims or amounts . . . [paid under §756-108]."

These statutes operate to protect the bank from

liability to one party on a multiple party account for
payment duly made to another party to the account.
In the instant case, there is a question as to
whether the $10,000 certificate was a single or multiple
party account at the time W. Youd contacted the bank. If the
$10,000 certificate of deposit was reissued in Plaintiff's
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name alone, the account lost its status as a multiple party
account and became a single party account.

Plaintiff

therefore became the sole owner of the certificate and as
such was the only person entitled to enforce, receive
payment of, and otherwise deal with the certificate.

W.

Youd had absolutely no interest in or control over the
account.

Accordingly, §§75-6-108 and 75-6-112 no longer

applied to protect the bank for payment of the account
according to W. Youd's instructions.

Neither W. Youd nor

Zions had a right, statutory or otherwise, to change the
payee on the account.

Sections 75-6-108 and 75-6-112 do

not apply to protect the bank from interfering with the
ownership rights of a single party account holder at the
request of a former party to the account.
The trial court erred in not properly examining the
facts surrounding the reissuance of the $10,000 certificate
of deposit.

A finding that the certificate was reissued

results in the inapplicability of Utah Code Ann. §§75-6-108
and 75-6-112.

Without the protection of these statutes, it

must be concluded that Zions caused Plaintiff's loss of the
value of the $10,000 certificate of deposit.
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POINT 2;

The issue of whether the $10,000
certificate of deposit had been
reissued is material for thie
further ireason that, if coml P l e ted,
Zions is sulbject to liabili ty for
conversion of the certificate.
An action for conversion is generally based on 1)

ownership of the property, 2) a right to possession of the
property, and 3) the alleged wrongdoer's unauthorized dominion over the property resulting in damages to the property owner.

Farmer State Bank of Victor v. Imperial Cattle

Co., 708 P.2d 223, 227 (Mont. 1985); see H.L. Allred v.
Hinkley, 8 Utah.2d 73, 328 P.2d 726, 728 (Utah 1958).

As a

named payee on the $10,000 certificate of deposit, Plaintiff
was an owner of the certificate.

As an owner of the certi-

ficate, Plaintiff had a right to possession and did in fact
have possession of the $10,000 certificate.

Finally,

Zions1s removal of Plaintiff's name from the certificate and
replacement of his name with the names of W. Youd's daughters, constitutes Zions' exercise of unauthorized interference with Plaintiff's rights to the certificate.
The facts indicate that W. Youd contacted Richard
Roach, the Branch Manager of the Spanish Fork Branch of
Zions, and instructed Mr. Roach to remove Plaintiff's name
from the $10,000 and $15,000 certificates of deposit and to
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replace it with the names of his two daughters.

He speci-

fically instructed Mr. Roach to not allow Plaintiff payment
of the $10,000 certificate under any circumstances.
However, if Zions completed the renewal of the
$10,000 certificate of deposit in Plaintiff's name alone,
Plaintiff was the sole owner of the certificate and as such
was the only person entitled to enforce, receive payment of,
and to otherwise deal with the certificate.

As a single-

party account, W. Youd no longer had any kind of ownership
interest in the certificate.

Consequently, at the time W.

Youd contacted Zions, he had no right to change the payee on
the account or to otherwise deal with the account.

Never-

theless, Zions complied with W. Youd's instructions and
filled out a new $10,000 certificate of deposit, replacing
Plaintiff's name with the names of W. Youd, LaRaine Mackley,
and Leona Warner.

The effect of Zions1 actions was to not

only interfere with Plaintiff's ownership of the certificate, but to extinguish all of Plaintiff's ownership right
in the certificate.

Zions should therefore be liable for

conversion of $10,000, the face amount of the certificate.
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ARGUMENT II
ACCEPTING THE TRIAL COURT'S
FINDING OF FACT THAT THE TRANSACTION HAD NOT BEEN COMPLETED, DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW
In order to grant a party's motion for summary
judgment, a trial court must find that the party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.
Civil Procedure.

Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of

In this case, Defendants were not entitled

to judgment as a matter of law on three alternative grounds.
These grounds are set forth below as Points 1, 2 and 3.
POINT 1:

Because Plai ntiff had piossession
of, endorsed , and duly presented
the $10, 000 certi:ficate o:e deposi t, Z ions is 1:iable to Plaintiff for' refusing to ma ke payment
Section 70A-3-116, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as amend-

ed) , of the Utah Uniform Commercial Code states that
An instrument payable to the order
of two or more persons
a) if in the alternative is
payable to one of them and may
be negotiated as charged or
enforced by any of them who
has possession of it; . . .
See Smith, Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co. of Western New York, 80
A.D.2d 496, 439 N.Y.2d 543 (1981).
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The $10,000 and $15,000 certificates of deposit
involved in this case were payable to "Wilford Youd or Garth
Youd."

According to §70A-3-116, whoever had possession of

either certificate of deposit was entitled, by mere possession of the certificate, to immediate payment upon
presentment. There is no dispute that Plaintiff had possession of the matured $10,000 certificate of deposit.
Additionally, Defendants admit that Plaintiff took the
$10,000 certificate of deposit to Zions and requested that
the certificate be "rolled over" in Plaintiff's name alone.
(R. 39.)

It should be noted that Plaintiff1s request that

the certificate be "rolled over" is no less a request for
payment than a request for cash.

In renewing the $10,000

certificate, the funds from the matured certificate would
have been used to fund the new certificate.

By reissuing

the $10,000 certificate, Zions would have effectively made
payment to Plaintiff.

Plaintiff's actions therefore

constituted due presentment of the certificate which gave
rise to an obligation on Zions1 part to accept and make
payment of the certificate.
Section 70A-3-507 provides that an instrument is
dishonored when presentment is duly made and due acceptance
or payment is refused.

§70A-3-507(1)(a).
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Accordingly,

Zions1 failure to renew the $10,000 certificate of deposit
according to Plaintiff's instructions constituted a dishonor
of the certificate.

Section 70A-3-507 also provides that

when an instrument is duly presented and dishonored, the
holder requires an immediate right of recourse against the
bank.

Based on §§70A-3-316 and 70A-3-507, Zions is liable

to Plaintiff for refusing to pay the $10,000 certificate of
deposit as requested by Plaintiff.
Zions is further liable to Plaintiff for failing to
pay the $10,000 certificate on the basis that Zions violated
the contractual terms stated on the face of the certificate
of deposit.

Those terms require that payment be made when

the certificate is 1) properly endorsed, 2) duly presented,
and 3) surrendered to the bank.

In this case, Plaintiff

complied with all three requirements and was therefore
contractually entitled to payment.
The trial court apparently failed to recognize
Plaintiff's statutory and contractual rights to payment
acquired by virtue of Plaintiff's possession of the $10,000
certificate of deposit.

Apparently assuming that §70A-3-116

does not apply, the court concluded that §75-6-112 controls
the question of whether Plaintiff was entitled to payment.
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Contrary to the unstated assumption of the court, Plaint i f f s statutory and contractual rights to payment are not
abrogated by §75-6-112 under the facts of this case.
Defendants

rely on §75-6-112 to claim that Zions

is not liable to Plaintiff for failing to renew the $10,000
certificate in Plaintiff's name.

As previously stated,

§75-6-112 "discharges the financial institution from all
claims for amounts [paid under §75-6-108 to one party of a
multiple-party account]."

This statute does not, however,

extend to relieve Zions of liability for failing to pay a
duly presented instrument.

Section 75-6-112 does not endow

a financial institution with the discretion to determine
whether or not to pay a duly presented certificate of
deposit.

In fact, the Uniform Probate Code sections have

absolutely no application to the question of payment of a
duly presented instrument.

Section 70A-3-116 of the Uniform

Commercial Code clearly requires that a financial institution must make payment of a duly presented certificate of
deposit by an alternate payee who has possession of the
certificate.

Where two requests have been made, Zions must

comply with the first duly made request for payment, but is
protected by §75-6-112 from liability for doing so.
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To construe §75-6-112 to mean that financial
institutions cannot be held liable for refusing to pay a
duly presented instrument would strip §70A-3-116 of meaning
and negate the remedy afforded under §70A-3-507. Additionally/ §§75-6-108 and 75-6-112 were designed to relieve banks
from the burden of determining the ownership interests of
the various parties in multiple-party accounts prior to
making payment on the account.

If §75-6-112 were construed

to give financial institutions the discretion to determine
whether to pay duly presented instruments, those institutions would be encouraged to investigate the ownership
interests of the various parties to assist them in determining whether to make payment on a multiple-party account.
This result would directly contradict the stated purpose of
the statutes protecting financial institutions for payment
made on multiple-party accounts.
In the instant case, the $10,000 certificate of
deposit held matured, was endorsed by Plaintiff who was a
named payee, and was duly presented and surrendered to the
bank.

Rather than pay the certificate of deposit as re-

quired by §§70A-3-116 and 70A-3-507 and the terms of the
certificate of deposit, Zions dishonored the instrument and
chose to await the instructions of the other party to the
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account.

The trial court erred in failing to apply §70A-

3-116 and in improperly applying 75-6-112 to protect Zions
from its refusal to pay the duly presented certificate of
deposit.
POINT 2;

Wilford Youd f s request that the
two certificates of deposit be reissued in his name and the names
of his two daughters was not a
"proper request" as required by
Utah Code Ann. §§ 75-6-108 and
75-6-101(12)
Looking again at §75-6-108, Utah Code Ann. (1953 as

amended):
Any multiple-party account may be
paid, on request, to any one or
more of the parties . . .
(Emphasis added.)

Defining the term "request," §75-6-

101(12) provides that:
"Request" means a proper request
for withdrawal, or a check or
order for payment, which complies
with all conditions of the account, including special requirements concerning necessary signatures and regulations of financial
institutions. . .
(Emphasis added.)

In view of §75-6-101, §75-6-112 does not

provide protection to a financial institution which complies
with a request for withdrawal of funds that is in violation
of the terms of the account.
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The terms of the two certificates of deposit at
issue are listed on the face of each certificate.

These

terms require that/ in order that payment be made, the
certificates be 1) presented to Zions; 2) surrendered to
Zions; and 3) properly endorsed.

W. Youd's "request"

consisted of a telephone conversation with Richard Roach
orally requesting that Mr. Roach remove Plaintiff's name
from the certificates and replace Plaintiff's name with the
names of Leona Warner and LaRaine Mackley.
44.

Roach Depo. at

W. Youd neither presented nor surrendered the certi-

ficates of deposit to Zions, nor did he endorse either of
the certificates.

Zions followed W. Youd's telephone

instructions despite the fact that W. Youd failed to meet
the payment requirements clearly set forth on the face of
the certificates of deposit. Zions* conduct violated the
contractual language which Zions drafted and set forth on
its own pre-printed certificates of deposit.
Because W. Youd's request was not a "proper request" as required by §75-6-101, Zions is not entitled to
the protection of §75-6-112.

To allow Zions protection

under §75-6-112 against liability from payment pursuant to
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an improper request would relieve financial institutions
from any responsibility of complying with the terms of the
multiple-party accounts in distributing funds under those
accounts.
POINT 3:

Even if the $10,000 certificate of
deposit had not been reissued,
Zions is su b ject to liabil ity for
conversion of bo th the $10 ,000 and
the $15,000 certificates of
deposit
A bailee/bailor relationship exists when there is a

delivery of the bailor's property and an acceptance by the
bailee of that property.

Webb v. Aero International, Inc.,

633 P.2d 1044, 1045 (Ariz. App. 1981).

Plaintiff testified

that he left the $10,000 certificate of deposit with Zions
to be reissued and placed, together with the $15,000 certificate in his safety deposit box.

G. Youd Depo. at 73-74.

Zions accepted the $10,000 certificate of deposit agreeing
to renew the certificate and to place both certificates in
Plaintiff's safety deposit box.

G. Youd Depo. at 74.

The resulting bailee-bailor relationship which
existed between Zions and Plaintiff required that Zions
exercise ordinary care in safeguarding the certificates of
deposit according to Plaintiff's instructions.
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M. Bruenger

& Co./ Inc. v. Dodge City Truck Stop, 675 P.2d 864, 868
(Kan. 1984). Ordinary care is defined as the care which a
person in similar circumstances would customarily use
towards similar bailed property. McGinness v. Grossman/ 391
P.2d 967, 969 (Wash. 1964).

Zions failed to exercise

ordinary care by neglecting to reissue the $10,000 certificate of deposit.

Zions was also negligent by failing to

place the reissued $10,000 and the $15,000 certificates of
deposit in Plaintiff's safety deposit box. Zions1 disregard
for the terms of the bailment in caring for the $10,000 and
the $15,000 certificates of deposit, as entrusted to it by
Plaintiff., constitutes negligence.
Where a bailee's acts clearly indicate a repudiation of the bailor's ownership rights to the property, the
bailee is liable for conversion of the bailed property.
Torix v. Allred, 606 P.2d 1334, 1339 (Idaho 1984). Furthermore, conversion may be established where it is demonstrated
that the bailee's conduct is in derogation of the bailor's
possessory rights.

Merchant's Leasing Co. v. Clark, 540

P.2d 922, 925 (Wash. App. 1975).
In this case, Plaintiff was a named payee on both
certificates of deposit and as such had ownership rights to
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the certificates of deposit.

Furthermore/ because Plaintiff

had possession of both the $10,000 and the $15,000 certificates of deposit, it was he, and not W. Youd, who had the
right to enforce, receive payment of, and to otherwise deal
with the certificates.

Zions failed to place the certi-

ficates of deposit presented to Zions by Plaintiff in
Plaintifffs safety deposit box.

Instead, Zions deliberately

filled out new certificates of deposit, leaving off Plaintiff's name and replacing it with the names of Leona Warner
and LaRaine Mackley.

Zions1 deliberate failure to comply

with Plaintiff's instructions clearly constitutes a repudiation of Plaintiff's rights to the certificates of deposit
acquired by virtue of Plaintiff's possession of the certificates of deposit. Accordingly, Zions is liable to Plaintiff for conversion of both the $10,000 and the $15,000
certificates of deposit.
Zions is liable for conversion for the additional
reason that in issuing the $10,000 certificate of deposit
according to W. Youd's instructions, Zions failed to obtain
W. Youd's endorsement.

Section 70A-3-419, Utah Code Ann.

(1953 as amended), states that "(1) an instrument is converted when . . . (c) it is paid on a forged endorsement."
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It is well settled that payment on a missing endorsement is
equivalent to payment on a forged endorsement, which establishes conversion.

Humberto Decorators/ Inc. v. Plaza

National Bank, 434 A.2d 618, 621 (N.J. 1981); Federal
Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Marine National Bank, 431 F.2d
341, 344 (5th Cir. 1970); Berkheimer's, Inc. v. Citizens
Valley Bank, 529 P.2d 903, 905 (Or. 1974).
The $10,000 certificate of deposit had already been
endorsed by Plaintiff for the purpose of renewing the
$10,000 certificate in Plaintiff's name alone.

Plaintiff's

possession and endorsement of the $10,000 certificate
entitled him to payment of the certificate.

Instead, Zions

made payment to W. Youd by filling out a new $10,000 certificate in the names of W. Youd and his daughters without
obtaining the endorsement of W. Youd.

Zions had no right to

make payment to W. Youd without W. Youd's possession,
presentment, and endorsement of the certificate.

Zions

payment to W. Youd without his endorsement constitutes
Zions1 conversion of Plaintiff's ownership interest in the
certificate.

Zions is therefore liable to Plaintiff for the

face amount of the instrument.

§70A-3-419(2).
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CONCLUSION
The facts of the instant case, when viewed in a
light most favorable to Plaintiff, present a genuine issue
of material fact as to whether Zions completed the process
of reissuing the $10,000 certificate of deposit in Plaintiff's name alone.

In view of this question of fact, the

trial court's grant of summary judgment was erroneous and
the case should be remanded to the lower court for a trial
on the disputed fact.
In addition to the factual issue, Defendants were
not entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

Plaintiff had

possession of, duly presented, endorsed and surrendered the
$10,000 certificate of deposit.

According to the Uniform

Commercial Code and the terms stated on the face of the
certificate, he was therefore entitled to immediate payment.
Zions' wrongful refusal to make payment to Plaintiff constituted a dishonor of the instrument and created a right of
recourse in Plaintiff.
Defendants were not entitled to judgment as a
matter of law for the further reason that W. Youd's request
to prevent payment to Plaintiff was not a "proper request."
Finally, as a bailee of the certificates, Zions reissuance
of the certificates in W. Youd's and his daughters' names
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constituted conversion of both of the certificates.

Because

Defendants were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law,
Plaintiff respectfully requests that this court reverse the
lower court's judgment and grant judgment in favor of
Plaintiff.
DATED this

day of August, 1988.
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
*******

GARTH YOUD,

Case Number

CV 87 457

Plaintiff,
vs.

RULING

RICHARD B. JOHNSON,
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN, a
partnership,
Defendants.
********

In this matter cross motions for summary judgment have
been made and submitted to the court in accordance with Rule 2.8,
and

the court having

considered

the memorandum

of

law, and

arguments presented at the pretrial held on February 26, 1988,
and having fully considered the matter now enters its:
RULING
The court denies the plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment.
The

court

grants

defendants'

motion

for

summary

judgment.
The stipulation of the parties leaves the only issue in
the case to be whether, althouah t-he defendant Johnson was guilty
of negligence in not attending to matters in a timely way, was
this negligence a proximate cause of the plaintiff's loss of the

Federal District Court lawsuit?

To put it another way, would the

Federal Court lawsuit have succeeded, or was likely to suceed had
counsel b€>en diligent in pursuing the case to a decision on its
merits?
There is no material issue of fact between the partiesc
The only fact issues relates to whether or not, accepting the
plaintiff's view of the facts, his dictation of a note to the
tellers at Zions Bank that interest on the $10,000.00 CD be
recovered and added to that certificate and rolled over into a
new certificate and issued in the name of plaintiff and placed in
his safety deposit box, was sufficient to give plaintiff the
benefit of the notice required by 75-6-112 Utah Code Annotated
1953 as amended

in that such a note if complying with that

statutes required notice would invalidate any subsequent action
taken by the bank in honoring the oral request of the other cotenant, Wilford Youd, plaintiff's father, that Garth's name be
removed from the certificate and two other family members along
with Wilfords be placed thereon.
The bank received an oral request from the co-tenant,
Wilford Youd, who it recognized as the purchaser of the CD and
whose direction they elected

to take in the: handling of the

$10,000.00 certificate which had matured.
Code Annotated, 75-6-108

The provisions of Utah

relieves the bank from

liability in

making a decision as to how to pay a multi-party account.

The

making a decision as to how to pay a multi-party account.

The

only circumstance where the bank would not escape liability by
making a Section 108 decision is where the bank

M

.

. . has

received written notice from any party able to request payment to
the effect that withdrawals in accordance with the terms of the
account should

not be permitted."

The notice given by the

plaintiff and written down by the bank employees, does not convey
the message required of the above cited statute which is in
effect a statement that there is a problem or conflict as to the
interests of the parties in the CD and until resolved or such
notice withdrawn the CD is to remain as is.

The message given

the bank by plaintiff was convert this account to his exclusive
dominion

and control which the bank chose not to honor and

elected to honor the direction of the other co-tenant.
The bank is therefore exonerated on both notes since
the message

went to both, but

there

is another

reason the

$15,000.00 CD was not affected by any notice of either party in
that the $15,000.00 CD had not matured and it could not be paid
to either tenant until maturity.
As to the other contention of the plaintiff that before
receiving

any

instruction

from

Wilford

employees had made the changes requested
$10,000.00 CD.

Youd

that

the

bank

by plaintiff on the

This is contrary to the facts established by

those who would have made the change to who said that it was not

done before the bank manager was consulted

and Wilford Youd

contacted them with other requests which were followed.
Therefore, it is clear

that the Federal

litigation

would have been adverse to plaintiff.
Counsel for the defendant is directed to prepare and
appropriate order granting summary judgment if within ten (10)
days

from

the

date

hereof

plaintiff

has

not

filed

written

requests for further proceedings.
DATED at Provo, Utah, this *2/

<3ay of March, 1988.

GEORGES. BALL IF, ^ODGE

ADDENDUM NO. 2

„cw
STEPHEN B. NEBEKER (A2371),
THOMAS L. KAY (A1778) and
PAUL D. NEWMAN (A4889) of
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Attorneys for Defendants
400 Deseret Building
79 South Main Street
P. 0. Box 45385
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANTS1
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT AND DENYING
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

GARTH YOUD,
Plaintiff,
V.

Civil No. CV-87-457

RICHARD B. JOHNSON and
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSON,
a partnership,

Judge Ballif

Defendants.
ooOoo
This matter is before the Court on plaintiff's motion
for summary judgment and defendants' motion for summary judgment
submitted pursuant to Rule 2.8.

Arguments of counsel were heard

at the pretrial conference on February 26, 1988.

After reviewing

the memoranda filed by the parties, hearing the arguments of
counsel, and good cause appearing, and pursuant to the Court's
Ruling dated March 21, 1988,

JINNEY
EKER
-ct Bldg
CE C I T Y ,

IT IS ORDERED that plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment is denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that defendants' motion for
summary judgment
icigment is
is granted.
granted.
DATED this

&

day of ^^^ t 4 _ ^ _ ,. 1988.
BY THE COURT:

i/

George E<^>Ballif
District Judge
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the K^j/h

day of March, 1988,

a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS" MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND DENYING PLAINTIFF'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, to the
following:
Roy G, Haslam
BIELE, HASLAM & HATCH
50 West Broadway, 4th Floor
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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ZIONS F I R S T NATIONAL B A N K
Issued mt

TYPE_
*IS CERTIFIES THAT there has been
•posited in this Bank the amount of
ya bfe to ,
Sdress

Branch
^;,:P*1

KW
W\

Wilfbrd Youd or Garth Yoad
360 Ea$t 400 Korth

erest at the rate o i ^ « 7 > * % per annum commencing from
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(J

Utah..

5Ite
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ritv
HafCa
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^ _

(10,000.00
529-24-5S62
Spanish Fork, li stJte I f t i E , Zip CodeB400U
Sept. 6
19 80 and payable „
.i$0
Social Security
or Identification Number

depositor, or If more than one, to either or any of said depositors or the survivor or survivors in current funds upon presentation and surrender of this certify
e property endorsed. Interest payable: Q quarterly
Immaturity.
s certificate shell be Automatically tr*ni*md for successive like maturity periods if the certificate is not presented »nd surrendered for payment within ten (10)
•s after the original or any renewed maturity date, or unless the Sank issues or mails notice to the contrary to depositors) or to either or any of said deitors at least ten (10) business days before any such maturity date, and any mailed notice shall be sent to the address above or then designated on Bank's
wds. The Interest rate for each renewal period shall be the prevailing rate of the Sank on new Time Certificates of like duration on renewal date. Certificate
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ADDENDUM NO. 5
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION
* * *

GARTH YOUDr
Plaintiff,

Civil No. C83-1368W

vs.

Deposition of:

ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK,

DONA JENSEN

Defendant.
* * *

Deposition of DONA JENSEN, taken at the instance
and request of the Plaintiff, at the law offices of Howard,
Lewis & Petersen, 120 East 300 North, Provo, Utah, on the 16th
day of May, 1984, at the hour of 9:00 a.m., before LANETTE
SHINDURLING, a Certified Shorthand Reporter, Utah License No.
122, and Notary Public in and for the State of Utah.

* * *

ASSOCIATED PROFESSIONAL REPORTERS
420 Kearns Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Telephone: 322-3441

14
Q

Do you understand that there's a difference between

the adjunctive "and" and the conjunctive "or"?
h

Yes, I do.

Q

Did you determine that the time certificate had, in

fact, and/or on it?
A

Yes.

Q

And his simple instruction to you was simply to do

what with that time certificate?
A

He wanted to renew it and just have it put in his

name.
Q

What did you say?

A

I did it.

Q

And did you take a time certificate that he had

furnished you and fill out another time certificate that would
be in the same amount with interest in his name only?
A

Yes.
MR. PRATT:

record.
Q

Off the record, if I can go off the

I think we may have a confusion as to dates here.
(BY MR. JOHNSON)

Let me handle it and we'll see

where we go.
How long did that process take, just five or ten
minutes?
A

Ten minutes at the moot.

Q

And Mr. Youd then received the time certificate for

the initial amount plus interest?

15
1

A

Yes.

2

Q

And walked out the door?

3

A

Yes.

4

Q

You personally delivered that to him?

5

A

Yes.

6

Q

And that was the end of your dealings with him?

7

A

Yes.

8

Q

Now, do you remember another occasion?

9

A

I think he brought in another certificate.

10

Q

At another time?

11

A

A couple of days or three days —

12

later.

13

Q

But in September of '82?

14

A

I'm not sure.

15

Q

And what happened on that occasion, did he again

16

come to you?

well, some days

17

A

Yes.

18

Q

Because he dealt with you now once before?

19

A

Yes.

20

Q

And what certificate did he give to you at this time?

21

A

I'm not sure.

22
23
24
25

It was just a —

I do not remember

the dollar amount.
Q

Was it another certificate again in the name of

Wilford Youd or Garth Youd?
A

Yes, it was.

16
Q

What was his instruction to you on that occasion?

A

The same as before.

Q

Do you know where he had come from?

A

No.

Q

Did you follow his instructions?

A

Yes.

Q

And did you give hira back another time certificate

of deposit in his name only with the face amount of the
initial deposit together with interest?
A

Yes.

Q

And he walked out the door?

A

Yes.

Q

Did anything else happen?

A

Not that I recall.

Q

No other conversations?

A

No.

Q

Did you meet with Mr. Youd again?

A

I'm not sure.

Q

If you did, you donft remember it?

A

I don't remember.

Q

And if you met with Mr. Youd before these two

I can't remember.

occasions that you've just described for me, you can't
remember them?
A

Not definitely.

Q

You just have a memory that you may have seen him

21
Q

Would you tell me what Irene's job was vis-a-vis

your job as of September of 1982?
A

Shefs installment loan secretary and would deal with

new accounts if the need arose.
Q

Now, you1re confident that the two times that you

met with Mr. Youd you were able to complete his instructions,
correct?
A

Yes.

Q

There was no holding onto the time certificates, you

did what he said while he was there?
A

Yes.

Q

Now, did you ever have a telephone conversation with

Mr. Youd?
A'

Not that I remember.

Q

Could you have had a conversation and don't recall

A

Possibly, yes.

Q

Now, did you ever deal with Leana Warner concerning

it?

her time certificates?
A

I could have.

Q

Do you have any memory of that?

A

Not definitely, no.

Q

Taking you back to about the same time period,

September of 1982 and when you dealt with Mr. Youd, do you
remember within a time period close thereto seeing Leona

30
where the bank has money on deposit in any form and various
people are making a claim to that money?
A

Not directly.

Q

Well, do you know of a bank policy that if more than

one person are claiming the same moneys that the bank refuses
to give it to anyone and pays it into Court or waits to be
ordered by the Court to pay it to a certain person?
A

No, I personally don't know that.
MR. JOHNSON:

That's all I have.

Give us one

second.
(Short recess.)
MR. JOHNSON:

No more questions.
EXAMINATION

BY MR. PRATT:
Q

I just have a couple of questions.

Mr. Johnson

asked you about two separate occasions on which Mr. Garth Youd
came to you and presented to you certificates that were
payable to either he or Wilford Youd and I think you testified
earlier that you had complied with his instructions, is that
right?
A

Yes.

Q

You issued him on both those occasions certificates

of deposit in the same amount that were flyable just to Garth
Youd?
A

Yes.
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